The nuclear non-proliferation regime, so vital to maintaining international peace and security, is under increasing threat, particularly from countries that deliberately violate their non-proliferation obligations. Experience with North Korea and Iran has demonstrated that non-compliance must be addressed promptly and effectively. Iran has sought to exploit inconsistencies in how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports violations, including its own case and that of Libya, as well as the less worrying but still significant cases of South Korea and Egypt. Clarifying the technical and statutory basis by which the IAEA exposes non-compliance is one immediate way the non-proliferation regime can be strengthened.
It is hard to believe that, more than 35 years after the adoption of the model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the meaning of 'noncompliance' is still uncertain and subject to debate. 1 Over the last few years, several questions have been repeatedly raised:
What is non-compliance? How does one distinguish non-compliance from 'minor reporting oversights'? What happens if the 'mistake' is a one-time incident? Who decides that a state is in non-compliance? Were South Korea and Egypt found to be in non-compliance in 2004 and 2005, and if so, why were they not reported to the UN Security Council? It is time for the IAEA Board of Governors to address these questions, set the record straight, and Exposing Nuclear Non-compliance assure that any future non-compliance is recognised and responded to consistently and effectively.
There is a broad consensus that states which violate or withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be allowed to benefit from the nuclearenergy assistance they received (under Article IV) while and because they were a party to the treaty, or to profit from their violation with impunity. It has therefore been recommended 2 that the Security Council should adopt a generic (non state-specific) and legally binding resolution, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, stating that if a state notifies its withdrawal from the treaty after being found by the agency to be in non-compliance with its safeguards undertakings, such withdrawal notice constitutes a threat to international peace and security and the state in question would have to surrender all materials and equipment it received under its safeguards agreement(s).
I have also suggested that the Security Council should adopt another generic resolution providing that, if a state is found to be in non-compliance and does not fully and proactively cooperate with the IAEA in resolving the issue and taking the necessary corrective actions, the non-compliant state would be obliged to temporarily suspend all sensitive nuclear-fuel-cycle activities (in particular those related to uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing and the separation of plutonium). 
Reporting non-compliance
According to Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, reporting a state to the Security Council for non-compliance with its safeguards undertakings can be seen as a process comprising the following steps, the last three of which can be taken in sequence or simultaneously:
Step 1: Agency inspectors report any non-compliance to the • director general, via the deputy director general for safeguards. Step 2: The director general transmits the report to the Board of • Governors.
Step 3: The board makes a formal finding of non-compliance.
•
Step 4: The board calls upon the state in question 'to remedy • forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred'.
Step 5: The board reports the non-compliance to all members • and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.
Since 2003, the IAEA Secretariat has reported specific cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements by Iran, Libya, South Korea and Egypt to the board (Step 2). The actions taken by the board in each case were inconsistent and, if they go uncorrected, will create unfortunate precedents. Certainly to be 'in breach of one's obligations to comply' and to be in 'noncompliance' is a distinction without a difference.
The same language was used in the director general's November 2003 report on Iran, in which he stated that 'in the past, Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities, with resultant breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement' which 'has given rise to serious concerns'. 'Diversion of nuclear material from declared nuclear activities, • or the failure to declare nuclear material required to be placed under safeguards' 15 (for example not declaring nuclear material in the initial inventory or imported thereafter).
Undeclared production of nuclear material (for example through • irradiation).
Undeclared use of exempted nuclear material in a nuclear • facility.
'Obstruction of the activities of IAEA inspectors, interference • with the operation of safeguards equipment, or prevention of the IAEA from carrying out its verification activities'.
16
Starting the construction • 17 or modifying the design of a nuclear facility without informing the agency.
When an Additional Protocol is in force, many more actions would constitute non-compliance, such as 'the failure to declare nuclear material, nuclear activities or nuclear related activities required to be declared under Article 2' or 'the undeclared manufacture of items referred to in Annex I' of the Additional Protocol.
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The non-proliferation regime would be significantly strengthened if the board were to confirm that any state-specific report on safeguards implementation (beyond the annual Safeguards Implementation Report 19 ),
transmitted by the director general to the board, is to be considered, unless explicitly stated otherwise, as a report of non-compliance (or a progress report on verification activities following a case of non-compliance).
Aside from clear cases of non-compliance, the extent to which an accumulation of safeguards-implementation problems -such as delayed provision of access to nuclear material or facilities, material unaccounted for, open questions and unresolved inconsistencies, inconclusive containment and surveillance results, and lack of cooperation with the agency -justifies a state-specific report to the board should be left to the judgement, and is the responsibility of, the IAEA Department of Safeguards and the director general. However, the board could insist that all such problems be reported in a sufficiently transparent way in the Safeguards Implementation Report.
This could include the names of the states where such problems have occurred without being resolved in a timely manner. It would allow the board, if it deems necessary, to request more information from the secretariat on any specific case of potential proliferation concern.
Where the director general has reported a case of technical and legal non-compliance, the board is not obliged to make a formal finding of non- In practice, reporting a state to the Security Council is achieved through a board resolution requesting the director general, on behalf of the board, to transmit the resolution to all members, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. However, the board has total freedom in formulating the resolution as it deems appropriate. With regard to the timing of Step 5, the board is obliged to report a finding of noncompliance to the Security Council, but the Statute does not specify a time limit for the board to do so. For instance, when the board adopted a resolu- 
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Some member states may object to the proposal that any state-specific report by the director general to the board is (unless explicitly stated otherwise) automatically deemed to be a report on non-compliance, because the IAEA Secretariat might then be less likely to report in that way any serious breach to the board, but would opt to report these breaches in a less transparent and detailed manner in the annual Safeguards Implementation
Report. Yet the risk that the secretariat would downplay material failures by any state to comply with its safeguards undertakings seems very low for several reasons. First, although in some cases there will inevitably be a question of judgement about whether or not to report failures and breaches in a state-specific report to the board, the secretariat cannot, and will not, take the risk of covering up a situation that might turn out, later on, to have been an indication of undeclared nuclear activities, thereby undermining the credibility of IAEA safeguards. Secondly, as demonstrated in the Libyan case, the secretariat and the board can qualify the non-compliance as they deem appropriate, taking into account corrective actions taken and cooperation provided by the state under review. In particular, the board can decide, as with Libya, to report the matter to the Security Council 'for information purposes only' with no negative consequence for the state in question.
Two unfortunate precedents
On 26 November 2004, the board decided not to adopt a resolution on South Korea and, therefore, not to report the case to the Security Council, setting an unfortunate precedent motivated at least in part by political considerations. Nevertheless, the chairman of the IAEA Board concluded that 'the Board shared the Director General's view that given the nature of the nuclear activities described in his report, the failure of the Republic of Korea to report these activities in accordance with its safeguards agreements is of serious concern'. 28 Since the board is obliged to report any case of non-compliance to the Security Council, not doing so in the case of South Nevertheless, the board decided neither to adopt a resolution nor to report the matter to the Security Council, and did not request that the report be made public, as had been done in the case of South Korea.
In its decision not to report Egypt to the Security Council, it is likely that the board took into account the South Korean precedent, its wish not to put Egypt in the same category as Iran, Egypt's cooperation with the agency, and the corrective actions it had already taken. In addition, it seems that the board considered that the nature of the undeclared activities described in the director general's report was not a matter of proliferation concern, taking into account that some of these activities had been the subject of open-source publications, that some of the activities took place 15-40 years earlier and that the amount of undeclared nuclear material involved was small.
None of these possible justifications can be considered satisfactory.
Indeed, many of the undeclared activities referred to in the report are of a sensitive nature, since they include the irradiation of uranium and thorium targets dissolved in three laboratories that had not been declared to the agency. Moreover, Egypt failed to declare imported un-irradiated fuel rods containing uranium enriched to 10% U-235, some of which had been used in undeclared fuel-dissolution experiments, said to have been carried out prior to entry into force of Egypt's safeguards agreement. The fact that some (but not all) of the undeclared activities were the subject of open-source publications cannot be a valid justification for not reporting them to the agency. Otherwise, the mere publication somewhere of something about nuclear experiments by a state engaged in clandestine nuclear activities would permit that state to claim a 'minor reporting oversight' whenever such activities were discovered.
Although some of the undeclared experiments took place decades ago, the uranium and thorium irradiation and dissolution experiments were conducted between 1990 and 2003 (about when the agency started its investigation). It would have been as accurate to say that Egypt has used undeclared nuclear material in undeclared activities over a period of more than 20 years as to say that the country's undeclared activities were minor because some took place so long ago.
That Egypt failed to declare 67kg of imported uranium tetrafluoride (UF 4 ), 3kg of uranium metal, 9.5kg of imported thorium compounds, unirradiated fuel rods containing 10% enriched U-235, and irradiation and dissolution experiments should not be considered a 'minor breach' of its safeguards agreement. These activities are highly significant, and treating them as minor would set a detrimental new standard. Iran used 'only'
1.6kg uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) for testing centrifuges at Kalaye Electric, and used about 400kg of UF 4 , 400kg of uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) and 30kg
of uranium metal in a number of undeclared experiments, which were not considered trivial by the board although the quantities involved could also be considered 'small'. to the agency, 'Egypt has explained that its past failure to report was attributable to a lack of clarity about its obligations under its safeguards agreement, particularly as regards small quantities of nuclear material used in research and development activities'. 36 After the extensive reporting on Iran and Libya this appears to be a weak excuse, and such undeclared nuclear material and activities constitute clear cases of non-compliance.
It would also be a major mistake for member states to consider that because all the undeclared activities uncovered by the IAEA in Egypt are
There is a danger of setting bad precedents permissible under the Non-Proliferation Treaty if declared and placed under safeguards, they should not be a matter of concern. Such a conclusion would negate the whole purpose of comprehensive safeguards agreements. It is true that, taken individually, the failures committed by Egypt would most likely not justify being reported to the board outside the annual Safeguards Implementation Report. However, because of their number and the extended period over which these failures have taken place, a special report to the board was justified.
The dilemma for the board is to decide whether or not these failures domain it is crucial that its reputation and the credibility of the safeguards regime be maintained. It is therefore necessary for the agency to formally acknowledge that in the past some of its decisions have created potentially damaging precedents that need to be corrected to avoid any impression that the implementation of the IAEA Statute is selective. Member states have repeatedly insisted that 'measures to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system with a view to detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities must be implemented rapidly by all concerned States'. 47 The Board of Governors will go a long way towards achieving this goal if it can demonstrate through its actions that it will not shirk its responsibilities when it comes to non-compliance with safeguards agreements. 
